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GEORGE

Successor
Liability in
New York
By George W. Kuney

that, when one corporate or other juridical person
uccessor
liability
is an exception
the general
rule
are transsells
assets
to another
entity, thetoassets
ferred free and clear of all but valid liens and security
interests. When successor liability is imposed, a creditor
or plaintiff with a claim against the seller may assert that
claim against and collect payment from the purchaser.
Historically, successor liability was a flexible doctrine,
designed to eliminate the harsh results that could attend
strict application of corporate law. Over time, however,
as successor liability doctrines evolved, they became, in
many jurisdictions, ossified and lacking in flexibility. As
this occurred, corporate lawyers and those who structure
transactions learned how to avoid application of successor liability doctrines. 1
There are two broad groups of successor liability
doctrines: those that are judge-made (the "common law"
exceptions) and those that are creatures of statute. Both
represent a distinct public policy that, in certain instances
and for certain liabilities, the general rule of nonliability
of a successor for a predecessor's debts, following an
asset sale, should not apply. This article addresses the sta2
tus of the first group, judge-made successor liability.
The current judge-made successor liability law appears
to have developed because of and in reaction to the rise of
corporate law in the last half of the 19th century and early
part of the 20th century. It may be better characterized as
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a part of that body of law, much like the "alter ego" or
"piercing the corporate veil" doctrines, 3 rather than as a
creature of tort law, although it is used as a tool by plaintiffs who are involuntary tort claimants.
Many sources and authorities list four, five, or six
basic types of situations in which judge-made successor
liability has sometimes been recognized: for example,
(1) express or implied assumption, (2) fraud, (3) de facto
merger, (4) mere continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise, and (6) product line.4 In fact, the matter is more
complicated than that. Each of these species of successor
liability has, within it, different subspecies with different
standards and variations in the jurisdictions that recognize them. Some use a list of mandatory elements while
others are based on a non-exclusive list of factors and
considerations to be weighed and balanced in a "totality of the circumstances" fashion. Some approaches that
relied on a flexible list of factors have evolved into one
consisting of one or more mandatory elements. In any
event, to state that there are only four, five, or six categories is to oversimplify the matter.5
The State of Successor Liability in New York
When examined in detail, the types of successor liability can be classified into five general species, each of
which is specifically defined on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. These are: (1) Intentional Assumptions of

One of the traditional exceptions
Liabilities, (2) Fraudulent Schemes to Escape Liability,
(3) De Facto Mergers, (4) The Continuity Exceptions: Mere
Continuation and Continuity of Enterprise, and (5) The
Product Line Exception.
When examining successor liability, especially when
moving from one jurisdiction to another, one should keep
in mind that there is variance and overlap between the
species and their formulation in particular jurisdictions.
The label a court uses for its test is not necessarily one
with a standardized meaning applicable across jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is dangerous to place too much reliance on a name; the underlying substance should always
be examined.
Intentional (Express or Implied)
Assumption of Liabilities
Intentional assumption is probably the simplest of the
successor liability species. Imposing liability on a successor that by its actions is shown to have assumed liabilities
is essentially an exercise in the realm of contract law,
drawing on doctrines of construction and the objective
6
theory of contract.
New York courts recognize the express or implied
assumption exception to the general rule of nonliability.
In the few cases which have addressed this exception,
courts have looked at the language of the purchase agreement to determine whether the successor has expressly
7
assumed any liabilities of the predecessor.
Fraudulent Schemes to Escape Liability
Fraudulent schemes to escape liability by using corporate law limitation-of-liability principles to defeat the
legitimate interests of creditors illustrate the need for
successor liability to prevent injustice. If a corporation's
equity holders, for example, arrange for the company's
assets to be sold to a new company in which they also
hold an equity or other stake, for less value than would
be produced if the assets were deployed by the original
company in the ordinary course of business, then the
legitimate interests and expectations of the company's
creditors have been frustrated. 8 By allowing liability to
attach to the successor corporation in such instances, the
creditors' interests and expectations are respected. The
challenge, of course, is defining the standard that separates the fraudulent scheme from the legitimate one.
While New York courts recognize the exception to the
general rule of nonliability for asset purchasers where
"the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape
[tort] obligations," 9 no published New York decision
appears to have analyzed the contours of the fraud exception.
De Facto Merger
In a statutory merger, the successor corporation becomes
liable for the predecessor's debts. 10 The de facto merger

exists where there has been a
"consolidation or merger of seller
and purchaser."
species of successor liability creates the same result in
the asset sale context to avoid allowing form to overcome
substance. A de facto merger, then, allows liability to
attach when an asset sale has mimicked the results of a
statutory merger except for the continuity of liability. The
main difference between the subspecies of defacto merger
among the various jurisdictions appears in how rigid or
flexible the test is. In other words, how many required
elements must be shown to establish applicability of
the doctrine? On one end of the spectrum is the lengthy,
mandatory checklist of criteria. On the other end is the
non-exclusive list of factors to be weighed in a totality-ofthe-circumstances fashion.
One of the traditional exceptions to the general rule
of nonliability exists where there has been a "consolidation or merger of seller and purchaser."" A transaction
structured as a purchase of assets may be deemed to fall
within this exception as a "de facto merger, even if the
parties chose not to effect a formal merger." 12 In analyzing whether a defacto merger has occurred, the following
points are considered:
(1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation of ordinary
business operations and the dissolution of the selling
corporation as soon as possible after the transaction;
(3) the buyer's assumption of the liabilities ordinarily
necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the
seller's business; and (4) continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets and general business operation. 13
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Not all of these factors necessarily need be present for a
4
finding of defacto merger'

Continuation of the Business:
The Continuity Exceptions
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits
successor liability when the successor continues the business of the seller: mere continuation and continuity of
enterprise. The two share roughly the same indications
but continuity of enterprise does not require continuity
of shareholders or directors or officers between the predecessor and the successor, a requirement said to be one
15
of mere continuation's dispositive elements or factors.
Courts are not altogether careful or uniform in labeling
which exception they are applying. There appear to be
four general subspecies of mere continuation and three of
continuity of enterprise. The similarity of these doctrines
16
to those of defacto merger is striking.

There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller
corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations;
2. the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as
legally and practically possible; and
3. the purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities
and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for
the uninterrupted continuation of normal business
21
operations of the seller corporation.
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address the
limits of the continuity of enterprise exception again until
1999, in Foster v. Cone-BlanchardMachine Co.22 In Foster,a
plaintiff, injured while operating a feed screw machine,
sued the corporate successor after receiving a $500,000
settlement from the predecessor corporation. 23 The court
held that "because [the] predecessor was available for
1.

The continuity of enterprise theory does not require strict
continuity between the predecessor and the successor.
Mere Continuation
As New York appears to have adopted the more expansive continuity of enterprise doctrine, discussion of mere
continual liability as an independent theory of recovery
seems to be unnecessary, although the state of the law in
this area of New York law is far from clear.
Continuity of Enterprise
As previously indicated, unlike the more traditional
and long-standing mere continuation exception, the
continuity of enterprise theory does not require strict
continuity between the predecessor and the successor
- although the degree or extent of continuity of owners,
directors and officers is a factor.17 Further, continuity of
enterprise generally does not require dissolution of the
predecessor upon or soon after the sale, which is often
a factor - and sometimes a requirement - in jurisdictions applying the mere continuation doctrine.' 8 All
the variations of the continuity of enterprise exception
derive from Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. 19 V ariations in the application of the Turner factors create the
three subspecies.
In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the
four traditional categories of successor liability and, in so
20
doing, developed the continuity of enterprise theory.
The court adopted the rule that, in the sale of corporate
assets for cash, three criteria would be the threshold
guidelines to establish whether there is continuity of
enterprise between the transferee and the transferor corporations.
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recourse as witnessed by plaintiff's negotiated settlement
with the predecessor for $500,000, the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability is inapplicable." 24
The Foster court thus resolved two issues left open in
Turner. First, the Michigan appellate decisions prior to
Foster cited Turner for the proposition that the continuity
of enterprise test comprised four elements or factors, following the four items enumerated in the Turner court's
holding and not the three listed in its announcement of
the rule. 25 The Foster court clarified that, in fact, only
three items are involved in the Turner rule, and they are
26
required elements.
Second, the Foster court held that the "'continuity of
enterprise' doctrine applies only when the transferor is
no longer viable and capable of being sued."27 The underlying rationale of Turner, said the court, was "to provide
a source of recovery for injured plaintiffs." 28 According
to Justice Brickley, Turner expanded liability based on the
successor's continued enjoyment of "certain continuing
benefits": "[T]he test in Turner is designed to determine
whether the company (or enterprise) involved in the lawsuit is essentially the same company that was allegedly
negligent in designing or manufacturing the offending
product. "29
The Foster decision thus appears to return Michigan
law to its state immediately after Turner was decided:
continuity of enterprise is a recognized doctrine of successor liability and the doctrine has three required elements.
To the extent that intervening decisions had narrowed
Turner with the addition of a fourth factor - whether

the purchasing corporation holds itself out to the world
as the effective continuation of the seller corporation
- that particular revision appears to have been reversed.
Further, to the extent that Turner's "guidelines" had been
considered factors by other courts adopting the continuity of enterprise, Foster made it clear that it interpreted the
rule as one comprising three elements.
At least one New York Supreme Court has adopted
the three-criteria test of Turner.30 "[1] whether there was
a continuation of the enterprise of the original entity;
[2] whether the original entity ceased its ordinary business operations and dissolved promptly after the transaction; [3] and whether the purchasing entity assumed
those liabilities and obligations of the seller normally
required for an uninterrupted continuation of the seller's
operation." 31 Interestingly, the court did not seem to
require a destruction of the plaintiff's remedies in order
to satisfy the second prong of the continuity of enterprise
test. 32 The court stated, "In the first sale, of course, [the
predecessor] did not dissolve promptly, but continued
on, in some form, for several years. What seems to be of
greatest importance, however, is that it was completely
out of the coffee granulizer business." 33 This application
of Turner (without the destruction of remedy requirement) begins to look more like a hybrid of Turner and Ray
v. Alad Corp., discussed below.

Not all New York courts have adopted continuity
of enterprise. Most important, the New York Court of
Appeals has not addressed this exception since it expressly decided not to adopt it in Schumacher v. Richards Shear
Co. Additionally, in 1984, the Supreme Court of Monroe
County noted that Schumacher refused to adopt the continuity of enterprise exception. 34
35
The Product Line Exception of Ray v.Alad Corp.
In Ray, the California Supreme Court recognized the
product line exception to the general rule of successor
nonliability. This is a species of liability that is very similar to continuity of enterprise, and the court articulated
the following "justifications" for imposing liability on a
successor corporation:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies
against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2) the successor's
ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk
spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the
successor to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily attached to
the original manufacturer's goodwill being enjoyed
by the successor in the continued operation of the
36

business.
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The term "justifications" is somewhat ambiguous
as to whether it connotes required elements or nonexclusive factors to be balanced, much like the Turner
guidelines.
Like the Michigan Supreme Court in Foster, which
revisited Turner well after the original opinion was
issued, the California Supreme Court returned to Ray
some years later to "clarify" things. In Henkel Corp.
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 3 7 the California
Supreme Court referred to these three justifications as
"conditions," thus suggesting that they were essential
elements under the product line exception. Despite
its name, the product line theory of successor liability
appears only rarely, if at all, to have been applied in a
reported decision to a successor that had acquired merely one of many product lines from the predecessor; in
nearly all reported cases, it appears to have been applied
to sales of substantially all of a predecessor's assets. 38 In
fact, one court has emphasized that the "policy justifications for our adopting the product line rule require the
transfer of substantially all of the predecessor's assets to
39
the successor corporation."
The product line doctrine, where accepted, breaks into
two distinct subspecies, which differ only as to whether
Ray's "virtual destruction of the plaintiff's [other] remedies" condition is strictly required in order to permit
recovery
The N.Y Court of Appeals analyzed both the product
line and continuity of enterprise exceptions in Schumacher,
ultimately stating, "[w]e do not adopt the rule of either
case [Turner or Ray], but note that both are factually distinguishable in any event." 40 This language has "resulted
in a debate and some disagreement as to whether or not
the Court of Appeals has rejected the two additional
exceptions, or simply found the two exceptions inapplicable to the facts in that case." 41 The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Third Department has adopted the
product line exception, 42 while the First Department has
not. 43 No N.Y. Court of Appeals decision has resolved this
split in the lower courts.

1. See George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 3 Fla.
St. U. Bus. Rev. 1 (2006). Note: list other of author's articles, if desired, rather
than mentioning them in the text at the conclusion.

Conclusion

15. Rest. 3d Torts § 12, cmt. g.; Am. L. Prod. Liab. 3d § 7:20 (2004). See, e.g.,
Holloway v. John C. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.S.C. 1977) (denying summary judgment to the defendant successor in a products liability suit
because (1) the business continued at its same address with virtually all of the
previous employees; (2) the successor was responsible for maintenance and
repairs on the products sold by the predecessor prior to its sale of assets; (3)
the successor continued manufacturing the same or similar products as the
predecessor; and (4) the successor held itself out to the public as a business
entity under a virtually identical name as its predecessor; not requiring continuity of ownership and control but calling the doctrine applied "mere continuation" anyway.); see also Mozingo v. Correct Mfg., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Mississippi law and citing Holloway & Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (upon which Holloway relied) as cases following the
continuity of enterprise theory); Am. L. Prod. Liab. 3d § 7:22 (noting that the
court in Holloway denied summary judgment to a successor despite a lack of
continuity of ownership even though the court treated its ruling as an application of the mere continuation theory); 2 Madden & Owen on Prod. Liab. § 19:6,
n. 25 (3d. ed. 2003) (noting an increasing number of courts have adopted the

The purpose of the successor liability doctrines was to
provide contract and tort creditors with an avenue of
recovery against a successor entity in appropriate cases
when the predecessor that contracted with them or committed the tort or the action that later gave rise to the tort
had sold substantially all of its assets and was no longer
a viable source of recovery. Its various species acted as a
pressure relief valve on the strict limitation of liability created by corporate law. The doctrine is in the nature of an
"equitable" doctrine insofar as it is invoked when strict
application of corporate law would offend the conscience
of the court. In large part, the doctrine remains intact and
U
still serves that purpose.
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A detailed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis and explanation of the
2.
state of judge-made successor liability law may be found at <www.law.utk.
edu/Faculty/APPENDXKuney.htm>. The author intends to update this
analysis at least twice a year so that it remains current.
3.
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving
the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 Bus. Law. 109 (2004).
4.
See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49 (Alaska 2001) (discussing varied approaches to determination of whether successor liability was
a creature of contract and corporate law or tort law as part of its choice of law
analysis and concluding that successor liability is a tort doctrine designed to
expand products liability law; collecting cases and other authorities on both
sides of the issue).
5.
The variance in states' approaches to successor liability and to the related
doctrines of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil are one of the reasons that
the federal courts have adopted a uniform federal common law of these subjects under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 E3d
294, 298-301 (3d Cir. 2005) (collecting authorities).
Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v. EMRE: New Hampshire Rejects Traditional
6.
Test for Corporate Successor Liability Following an Asset Purchase,45 N.H. B.J 26
(2004).
See, e.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 823, 402
7.
N.Y.S.2d 565 (1977) (finding no express or implied assumption by a successor
in a purchase agreement); Valenta Enters., Inc. v. Columbia Gas of N.Y., Inc., 116
Misc. 2d 536, 539, 455 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct., Broome Co. 1982) (finding neither
express assumption of liability nor anything "presented to the court which
would warrant a finding of implied commitment to assume such responsibilities."); Emrich v. Kroner, 79 A.D.2d 854, 854, 434 N.Y.S.2d 491 (4th Dep't 1980)
(finding that, "from the terms of the purchase agreement... [the successor]
agreed to assume the tort liability of [the predecessor] arising out of incidents
occurring after the closing date").
8.
Causation is a required element of all species of the fraud exception. See,
e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 2005 WL 1791562 (Mass. Super. Ct. June
14, 2005) (discussing need for causation, but also that judgment creditors could
look to company's long term prospects, not just immediate insolvency).
9.
See Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 245, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437
(1983).
10. G. William Joyner, III, Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Successor Liability in
North Carolina,30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 889, 894 (1995).
11.

See Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d 239.

12. In re N.Y. City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d 254, 256, 789 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1st
Dep't 2005).
13. ld.; see Sweatland v. Park Corp., 181 A.D.2d 243, 245, 587 N.Y.S.2d 54 (4th
Dep't 1992).
14. In re N.Y. City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d at 256 (citing Fitzgeraldv. Fahnestock
& Co., 286 A.D.2d 573, 730 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1st Dep't 2001)).

continuity of enterprise exception including the Holloway court and the Ohio
Supreme Court in Flaugherv. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d 60 (1987))
(this treatise is authored by David Owen, the Carolina Distinguished Professor
of Law at the University of South Carolina); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning
Successor Liability, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 845, 854 n.44 (1999) (noting that states
following the continuity of enterprise approach include South Carolina (citing
Holloway); Ohio (citing Flaugher), Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi, and New
Hampshire (citing Cyr); Philip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of the Enterprise
Doctrine: Corporate Successorship in United States Law, 10 Fla. J. Int'l L. 365, 375
(1996) (collecting cases applying the continuity of enterprise theory, including
Holloway and Flaugher); 30 S.C. Jur. Products Liability § 12 (stating the court
in Holloway denied the successor's motion for summary judgment "where the
evidence indicated that the [successor] was a mere continuation of the predecessor corporation"); Rest. 3d Torts § 12, cmt. c (citing only Alabama, Michigan,
and New Hampshire as jurisdictions that have adopted the continuity of enterprise theory).
16. Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 221 (Vt. 2005). Cases from
the beginning of the last century in Idaho preserve another term that seems to
capture all or part of the defacto merger, mere continuation, and continuity of
enterprise exceptions: "reorganization."
17. Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174 (noting that the traditional mere continuation
exception requires identity of stockholders, directors and officers); see also
Savage Arms Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 55 (Alaska 2001) (mere continuation theory requires "the existence of identical shareholders").
18. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976)
(dissolution of the seller soon after the sale one of four enumerated factors
indicating continuity of enterprise).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 879 (citing McKee v. Harris-SeyboldCo., Div. of Harris-IntertypeCorp.,
264 A.2d 98, 103, 105 (1970)). These are three of the four factors from McKee
used to determine whether liability will arise under the defacto merger form of
successor liability.
22. 597 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999). In the interim, the court cited Turner in
three decisions, none of which clarified the key Turner holding. Jeffery v. Rapid
Am. Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644, 656 (Mich. 1995) (citing Turner for the proposition that corporate law principles should not be rigidly applied in products
liability cases); Stevens v. McLouth Steel Prods.Corp., 446 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Mich.
1989) (citing Turner as a case where the Michigan Supreme Court discussed
the doctrine of successor liability in the context of a products liability suit);
Langley v. Harris Corp., 321 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Mich. 1982) (citing Turner for the
proposition that an acquiring corporation maybe held liable for
products liability claims arising from activities of its predecessor corporation under a continuity of enterprise theory but then
holding that the Turner rationale will not allow a corporation to
seek indemnity from the plaintiff's employer in a products liability suit). One appellate court decision between Turner and Foster
A
concluded that satisfying the fourth consideration in Turner (the
purchasing corporation's holding itself out as a continuation of
the selling corporation) was not sufficient for a finding of successor liability where the first three considerations were not met. Pelc
v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich. Ct. App.
982) (Where a successor bought only 8% of the assets of another
corporation in a bankruptcy sale and did not meet the first three
criteria of Turner but held itself out as a continuation of the liquidating corporation, the mere continuation test was not satisfied.
.The court noted that to impose successor liability in such circumstances would effectively be an adoption of the broader "product
line exception").

26.

Foster,597 N.W.2d at 510.

27.

Id.at 511.

28. Id. Justice Brickley, in dissent, disagreed with the majority as to the underlying rationale of Turner.
29.

Id. at 513.

30. Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 130 Misc. 2d 626, 633, 497
N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1985).
31. Id. at 628 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich.
1976)).
32.

Id. at 626.

33.

Id. at 633.
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